

MIXED MESSAGING: GRAND STRATEGY AND THE ARAB SPRING (2010-2011)

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Abstract

This research study was intended to determine how the US Government publicly responds to democratizing movements in non-democratic strategic partner states and non-democratic adversarial states in light of its longstanding grand strategic goal of promoting democracy. Specifically, this study addressed how the U.S. Department of State responded to the events of the Arab Spring through purposive sampling of archived press releases from the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs for a period of measurement of December 1, 2010 through December 31, 2011. All 147 press releases within the period of measurement were subjected to multivariate analysis through summative qualitative content analysis, including a (quantitative) frequency count of key terms to determine language usage and a (qualitative) contextual and content analysis of language evolution as well as theme development. The final conclusion of this study was that the US Government maintained pre-existing security relations with strategic security partners while publicly calling for liberalization via the transitional paradigm within those partner states. The US Government supported democratization in adversarial states according to this research; however, state-sanctioned violence is an intervening variable within this research that strongly correlates with adversarial states. It is plausible an adversarial state that does not engage in systematic state-sanctioned violence against protestors may not be subjected to direct calls for democratization.

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Introduction

The concepts of freedom and democracy are integral parts of the identity of the United States (US). Though ideology may divide the policymakers of the US, certain principles remain consistent between their platforms. One consistency is the shared stance on the role of the US Government (USG) regarding the international promotion of democratic values – it is sufficiently important to be featured in multiple National Security Strategies (NSS) spanning three presidential administrations, all of which link democratic nations and the diffusion of democratic values to US national security.¹ While each presidential administration outwardly shared the desire to promote democracy, it is unclear how the agenda of promoting democratic values fared when it conflicted with other national security interests.

President Bush's Rhetoric

President George Bush's 2006 NSS provided tacit acknowledgment that compromise would be necessary to meet the varied and sometimes competing national security interests.² During the Global War on Terror, President Bush actively advocated for democracy in Muslim nations as a means to improve overall social, economic, and political conditions within the Muslim world at a time when the U.S. was viewed critically by many Muslims for his administration's counterterrorism strategies.³ The Bush administration's willingness to compromise its identified democratization mission

¹ A National Security Strategy for a Global Age. December 2000. Page 1. | The National Security Strategy of the United States of America. September 2002. Page ii. | The National Security Strategy of the United States of America. March 2006. Page 1. | National Security Strategy. May 2010. Page 5, 37-39.

² The National Security Strategy of the United States of America. March 2006. Page 11.

³ Nancy J. Davis and Robert V. Robinson, "Freedom on the March? Bush's Democracy Doctrine for the Muslim World," *Contexts* 6, no. 2 (Spring 2007): pp. 22-24.

in favor of strategic security policy undermined the importance of democratic reform. This contradictory policy stance was most clearly observed in states that were both governmentally authoritarian and a US security partner in the broader global counterterrorism mission; Egypt under Hosni Mubarak is identifiable as one such non-democratic security partner that actively violated the fundamental rights of its citizenry and meddled in its domestic elections, yet only received “mild rebukes” from the US Department of State for those violations and was still granted significant USG financial aid by virtue of its security relationship with the US and its prominent role in Arab World politics.⁴

President Obama’s Rhetoric

President Barack Obama’s May 2010 NSS also recognized the need to prioritize among the various agendas in order to support the broader US national security.⁵ The 2010 NSS stated support for the promotion of democratic values and for peaceful democratic movements while embracing a less assertive rhetoric than the earlier Bush administration NSS documents regarding the promotion vs. imposition of democratic values.⁶ Related to the Middle East, the 2010 NSS specifically identified several US interests related to Arab states; the first listed interest is the ongoing development of security ties to “Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia and other Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries – partnerships that enable out militaries and defense systems to work together more efficiently.”⁷ Middle East security interests are referenced again in the

⁴ Davis and Robinson, “Freedom on the March?,” pp. 23.

⁵ National Security Strategy. May 2010. Page 9-10.

⁶ National Security Strategy. May 2010. Page 5, 37-39.

⁷ National Security Strategy. May 2010. Page 45.

NSS through the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's Istanbul Cooperation Initiative with GCC countries for mutual security interests.⁸ The 2010 NSS also identified protection of individual and collective rights, freedoms, and needs linked to the political, social, and economic spheres of activity; support for civil society and human rights activists; and the promotion of governmental reform as strategic interests in the region.⁹

The fact that security is listed before and after other fundamental regional issues, such as promoting individual freedoms or democracy in a region that is long associated with autocratic rule, is to be expected given American concerns within the region and may be an indicator of an unstated prioritization of interests. The administration's aim to develop stronger security ties with Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia linked the US regional security strategy to non-democratic nations. Freedom House, a US-based non-government organization that studies human rights, democracy and freedoms in nations around the world, assessed in 2010 that all three of those states were neither free nor electoral democracies.¹⁰ These security ties with non-democratic states and the administration's support for democracy promotion continue Bush's earlier contradictory policy stance on democratization, an approach the 2010 NSS categorized as "principled engagement."¹¹

The Arab Spring

It is this juxtaposed position that is of interest to this study. Beginning in December 2010, there was a wave of popular uprisings seeking government reform and

⁸ National Security Strategy. May 2010. Page 45.

⁹ National Security Strategy. May 2010. Page 45.

¹⁰ Arch Puddington (ed), *Freedom in the World 2010: The Annual Survey of Political Rights and Civil Liberties*, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc, (New York; 2010): pp. 207, 209, 342-343, 565-566.

¹¹ National Security Strategy. May 2010. Page 38.

democratization throughout the Middle East and North Africa. These uprisings, known as the ‘Arab Spring,’ provide an unique opportunity to examine how the USG publicly engaged with democratizing movements across a number of different states with varying diplomatic relationships with the US. Do the wave of popular protests advocating for democratic reforms inspire a change in US policy or does the strategic security stance remain unfettered as the dominant determining factor for US foreign policy? Does an ideal trump a pragmatic practice? Using the May 2010 NSS as a guide on the Obama administration’s grand strategy, a subset of public press releases issued by the USG will be analyzed to determine how closely the administration’s rhetoric adheres to its proclaimed support for democratization when that democratization conflicts with security strategy.

Literature Review

Within the context of this study, the primary areas of interest are the studies of Grand Strategy, Prioritization of Interests, and Democratization.

Grand Strategy

While it is relatively unburdened with operational level details or specific policy proposals, a NSS provides insights into the focus of a presidential administration and it outlines the grand strategy for near-, mid-, and long-term policy efforts for that administration, *ceteris paribus*. The Obama administration’s identification of promoting democracy as one policy goal in the 2010 NSS indicates that it forms a part of the administration’s grand strategy.¹²

¹² National Security Strategy. May 2010. Page 37.

Per Murdock and Kallmyer (2011), US policymakers should focus on the creation of an overarching grand strategy which incorporates the nation's prioritized goals and the manner in which these goals are to be met.¹³ This prioritization of national goals is necessary amid a period of declining resources and relative influence.¹⁴ Resource limitations obligate policymakers to choose between various agendas, leading to outcomes that may compromise ideals or lower priority national objectives, but are still consistent with the long-term high priority national goals. The 2010 NSS, while it did list policy goals, failed to formally prioritize its various agendas, creating uncertainty regarding the extent to which the administration will pursue its declared goals. As such, a purpose of this study is to attempt to induce how the goal of promoting democracy and human rights is prioritized during a period of social conflict in a strategically significant region of the world.

The principle of grand strategy itself is not without its opponents; forming an overarching grand strategy has been challenged as an impractical exercise in the modern era due to the confluence of domestic partisan politics and populist movements, the loss of a shared US national narrative and identity, and the non-polarized world system controlled by state and non-state actors.¹⁵ In place of grand strategy, Drezner Krebs, and Schweller (2020), propose decentralization and incrementalism, where power is localized to the regional USG actors or granted to the pertinent USG experts rather than enshrined at the White House and responses to world events are addressed in an ad hoc, graduated

¹³ Clark Murdock and Kevin Kallmyer, "Applied Grand Strategy: Making Tough Choices in an Era of Limits and Constraint" *Orbis*, (Fall 2011): pp. 542.

¹⁴ Murdock and Kallmyer, "Applied Grand Strategy," pp. 544.

¹⁵ Daniel Drezner, et al., "The End of Grand Strategy: American Must Think Small," *Foreign Affairs* 99, no. 3 (May/June 2020): pp. 108.

manner commensurate with the matters in question.¹⁶ While Drezner et al., are correct regarding the increasing difficulty of crafting a grand strategy and regarding the failure to prioritize within the strategies, they ignore the purpose of having a grand strategy as a guide to policy over the course of an administration. Moreover, they assume that today's society is a unique moment of political conflict, which may be a result of an oversimplification of historical conflict and hindsight bias. They are also correct in their assessment that decentralized and incremental responses to emergent crises may allow for a relatively more coherent response in situ, but it would likely lead to disjointed or inconsistent responses in a larger context and may encourage isolationistic tendencies.

Deep engagement has been the primary grand strategy employed by the US in the post-WWII era. As an approach, it requires robust international ties in the economic, political, and security sectors.¹⁷ In exchange for these ties, a Great Power is able to exert significant influence across global commons, create international standards and institutions, gain access to new markets, and become a model for developing states. Per Christopher Layne, a significant shortcoming of deep engagement is the expenses of maintaining global networks which is further exacerbated by limited or decreasing resources.¹⁸ Barry Posen argues that deep engagement, or the liberal hegemon model, encourages smaller powers to counterbalance or bandwagon against the Great Power.¹⁹

The 2010 NSS acknowledges overreach on the part of the previous administration through its repudiation of "imposing" US values on other countries. Engagement with

¹⁶ Drezner, et al., "The End of Grand Strategy," pp. 117.

¹⁷ Stephen Brooks, G. John Ikenberry, and William Wohlforth, "Lean Forward," *Foreign Affairs* 92, no. 1 (January/February 2013): pp. 130-142.

¹⁸ Brooks et al, "Lean Forward," pp. 130-142.

¹⁹ Brooks et al, "Lean Forward," pp. 130-142.

other states and peoples is actively advocated as a means of strengthening the US and the international order upon which the US is reliant; isolationism is rejected as contrary to US interests.²⁰

Emma Ashford (2018) calls for a more restrained form of grand strategy, specifically in the form of less ambitious goals and through offshore balancing as was embraced in the Middle East during the Cold War.²¹ Offshore balancing is a method Ashford assesses would reduce the US defense expenditures in the region and end the contest between security demands and democracy promotion goals by reducing the need to be militarily positioned in the region and using more diplomacy.²² It is unclear whether Ashford accepts democratization promotion as a legitimate goal for US foreign policy at the strategic level; however, within the framework of this study, promotion of democracy is most clearly observed from the diplomatic frame of reference. Offshore balancing could be a theoretical construct through which the 2010 NSS Middle East policies are enacted if the administration truly does assume a more ‘hands-off’ approach and is unwilling to continue deep engagement.

National Values and National Interests

Prioritization of interests is key to a grand strategy. Two of the major lines of thought within the scholarly literature regarding the role of values promotion as a part of national interests are realism and liberal internationalism. Realism, derivative of the traditional realist worldview, considers democracy promotion to be counterproductive to

²⁰ National Security Strategy. May 2010. Page 1-5, 11-12.

²¹ Emma Ashford, “Unbalanced: Rethinking America’s Commitment to the Middle East,” *Strategic Studies Quarterly* 12, no. 1 (Spring 2018): pp. 128-129.

²² Ashford, “Unbalanced,” pp. 132, 135.

maintaining national power, placing primacy on traditional security and economic interests and allowing no consideration of the domestic politics of foreign states.²³ Liberal internationalism embraces democracy promotion as a way to construct an international system that is more receptive to American machinations through the spread of new democratic states.²⁴ Notably, values promotion is not the dominant feature of this particular approach, with traditional security and economic interests maintaining significant sway over foreign policy. It is expected that the USG approach in this study will comply with liberal internationalism, although it is uncertain how direct values promotion will be for partner and adversarial states.

Research related to how national values and core national interests relate in foreign policy is inconclusive due to the absence of an adequate means to prioritize between competing frames of reference (i.e. a moralistic approach or a realistic approach). Interests and values can be pursued in unison, but conflict between these competing principles is likely, which may lead to incoherent policy or an action which fails to meet either the national interest or national value.²⁵ Depending on how national values are framed, different results may emerge. The advancement of universal values results in a cosmopolitan outlook that reinforces fundamental rights while acknowledging the role of unique cultural influences on the development of democracy.²⁶ Such an approach is intended to be inclusive in nature. A more exclusionary approach to values promotion as a national interest is formed when the promoted values are fundamentally

²³ John Owen, "Democracy, Realistically," *The National Interest* 83 (Spring 2006): pp. 35.

²⁴ Nicolas Bouchet, "The Democracy Tradition in US Foreign Policy and the Obama Presidency," *International Affairs* 89, no. 1 (January 2013): pp. 36.

²⁵ Jonathan Gilmore, "The Uncertain Merger of Values and Interests in UK Foreign Policy," *International Affairs* 90, no. 3 (May 2014): pp. 542.

²⁶ Gilmore, "The Uncertain Merger of Values and Interests in UK Foreign Policy," pp. 544.

nationalistic, unique to a specific country or culture.²⁷ These values are not easily transferred to other nations, regardless of the effort expended by the promoting state.

External Actors in Democratization

Democratization can be defined in a variety of ways depending on the model employed. The minimalist model places primacy upon free and competitive elections.²⁸ Electoralism fallacy is the key failing of this model, as identified by Karl (1990), where the act of holding competitive elections is the principle characteristic by which a nation is deemed democratic.²⁹ The minimalist approach is overly broad since competitive elections can be held in autocratic states as a token measure of reform or as a means of legitimizing the government.

An alternative approach is the evolutionary model. Dahl (1971) and Eckstein (1998) both advocate for an evolutionary model of democratization where governmental reform, specifically rule of law and protection/promotion of civil society, is instituted over an extended period of time to prevent the premature abortion of the democratic experiment in developing states.³⁰ Similar to the evolutionary model, the transition paradigm, formed by O'Donnell, Schmitter, and Whitehead, is a process in which a non-democratic state forms the political structure, establishes a civil society, and then enfranchises the people.³¹ Scholars have rejected the transition paradigm as a viable

²⁷ Gilmore, "The Uncertain Merger of Values and Interests in UK Foreign Policy," pp. 549. | Bouchet, "The Democracy Tradition in US Foreign Policy and the Obama Presidency," pp. 37.

²⁸ Richard Rose and Doh Chull Shin, *Democratization Backwards: The Problem of Third Wave Democracies*, Centre for the Study of Public Policy, University of Strathclyde (Glasgow; 1999): pp. 6.

²⁹ Rose and Shin, *Democratization Backwards*, pp. 6.

³⁰ Rose and Shin, *Democratization Backwards*, pp. 5.

³¹ Michael Shulz, "The Role of Hamas in Building Palestinian Democracy in the Midst of Violence," in *The Democratization Project: Opportunities and Challenges*, Ashok Swain, Ramses Amer, and Joakim Öjendal (eds.). Barbara Budrich Publishers (2007): pp. 115.

means of democratization due to the consistent pattern of failure to transition to democracy among non-democratic states.³²

Both the transition paradigm and the evolutionary model suffer from the same faults in that the democratizing states do not need to commit to democracy, and the state's elites are able to consolidate power during the "transitional" period. These states may allow select liberalization initiatives to be implemented over time, but liberalization does not necessarily lead to the same structural changes as full democratization. It is potentially at the convergence of the concepts like the minimalist model, the evolutionary model, and the transition paradigm that non-democratic US strategic allies are able to indefinitely delay democratization efforts in favor of selective liberalization of their societies and further consolidate power. This study is intended to identify how the USG promotes democracy with public statements, specifically whether the USG encouraged piecemeal liberalization or full democratization.

Whitehead (2007) and Swain, Amer, and Öjendal (2009) assert that with each case of democratization, it becomes less certain that democratization is a process which can be artificially engineered or accurately predicated due to the variability in every case.³³ Research regarding the promotion of democratization is similarly multifaceted due to the expanded roles for supranational entities, non-government organizations, and private interests in addition to the traditional role played by the state actor. Whitehead

³² Laurel Miller, Jeffrey Martini, F. Steven Larrabee, Angel Rabasa, Stephanie Pezard, Julie Taylor, and Tewodaj Mengistu, "Democratization and Democracy Promotion: Trends, Theories, and Practices," in *Democratization in the Arab World: Prospects and Lessons from Around the Globe*, RAND Corporation (2012): pp. 16.

³³ Laurence Whitehead, "Twenty-First Century Democratizations: Experience Versus Scholarship," in *Democratization: The State of the Art*, 2nd ed, Dirk Berg-Schlosser (ed.). Barbara Budrich Publishers (2007): pp. 111-112. | Ashok Swain, Ramses Amer, and Joakim Öjendal, *The Democratization Project: Opportunities and Challenges*, Anthem Press (UK: 2009): pp. 2.

(2007) details that external powers are able to directly influence the democratization process from actions that span from conditionality of support (e.g. financial support) to full control (i.e. imposed democratization), while simultaneously acknowledging the ability of external powers to indirectly influence non-democratic states by virtue of their citizens' desire to attend US and European universities as well as through other forms of soft power influence.³⁴ Mansfield and Snyder assess that external powers lack a significant impact on the domestic democratization of foreign states.³⁵ Research indicates that while aggregate foreign aid does not encourage democratization, "targeted democratization assistance" does provide some support to democratic transitions; however, states that receive significant US military aid have been assessed to be less effected by targeted democratization assistance.³⁶ Durac and Cavatorta (2009) assessed that promotion of democracy within non-democratic security partner states through economic liberalization policies reinforces the authoritarian government due to its role in controlling the economy and establishing patronage networks.³⁷ Ironically, this form of liberalization encourages the people to lend greater support to the authoritarian government in order to benefit economically, therefore citizens' financial well-being comes at the expense of expanded political freedoms.

Keck and Sikkink (1998) provide a social movement theory perspective via the boomerang effect, which posits that a social movement organization (SMO) is able to

³⁴ Whitehead, "Twenty-First Century Democratizations," pp. 123.

³⁵ Lars-Erik Cederman, Simon Hug, and Andreas Wenger, "Democratization and War in Political Science," in *War and Democratization: Legality, Legitimacy, and Effectiveness*, Wolfgang Merkel and Sonja Grimm (eds.), Routledge (London, 2009): pp. 55.

³⁶ Miller et al, "Democratization and Democracy Promotion" pp. 28-29.

³⁷ Vincent Durac and Francesco Cavatorta, "Strengthening Authoritarian Rule through Democracy Promotion? Examining the Paradox of the US and EU Security Strategies: The Case of Bin Ali's Tunisia," *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 36, no. 1 (April 2009): pp. 12, 14.

leverage external pressure from states and non-state entities to meet the SMO's objectives within a host state.³⁸ Seeking support outside of the SMO's host state allows the organization to reframe the traditional political opportunity structure for redressing grievances by incorporating international and transnational actors.³⁹ Reframing democratization under the umbrella of social movement theory may present a different theoretical framework for democratization, but it is uncertain how effective social mobilization could be in autocratic states reluctant to implement governmental reform. This is a possible area for theoretical expansion, especially due to the persistent irregularities within the study of democracy and the routine development of new models for each variation of democratization or failure to transition to democracy.

Hypothesis

The proposed hypothesis for this research study is the following: the collocation of significant US security interests and a democratizing movement in a non-democratic strategic partner state will result in a lessened USG focus on promoting democracy in favor of pre-established security interests. This can be assessed by evaluating how the USG publicly responded to democratizing movements throughout the Middle East and North Africa during the Arab Spring. The anticipated conclusion is that the USG will favor a strategy supporting the overall national security interests (securitization) in partner states, while encouraging democratization in adversarial states.

³⁸ John Guidry, Michael Kennedy and Mayer Zald, *Globalizations and Social Movements*, The University of Michigan Press (Ann Arbor, 2000): pp. 1.

³⁹ Guidry et al. *Globalizations and Social Movements*, pp. 2.

Methods

Summative qualitative content analysis is the principal tool of this research study, a method outlined by Hsieh and Shannon (2005) combined with the multivariate content analysis concept of Robert Mitchell (1967).⁴⁰ Summative qualitative content analysis combines a quantitative frequency count with a qualitative latent content analysis, providing the study a focus on language usage and development. The purposively sampled dataset was reviewed through a frequency count using a list of key terms developed through a priori and inductive approaches to determine language use in the dataset. The frequency count was facilitated through the PDF word find function. All matches to the key terms and associated derivative terms were recorded in tables for further analysis. These tables were organized by term, time (month and year), and press release. After every text was quantitatively reviewed, the texts were comparatively analyzed based on their frequency counts, relevance to the Arab Spring protests and country of focus to determine correlations for language use in partner states and in adversarial states. Subsequently, latent content analysis of the dataset was conducted to identify how language use changed within the dataset, both between adversarial and partner states and within each state's associated press releases, as well as develop themes. Relevant findings were documented in country-specific memos.

Use of the frequency count and the latent content analysis is intended to provide within-method triangulation, thus increasing the internal validity of the study's findings by identifying convergence through the two approaches with primacy assigned to the

⁴⁰ Hsiu-Fang Hsieh and Sarah Shannon, "Three Approaches to Qualitative Content Analysis," *Qualitative Health Research* 15, no. 9 (December 2005): pp. 1283-1285. | Robert Mitchell, "The Use of Content Analysis for Explanatory Studies," *The Public Opinion Quarterly* 31, no. 2 (Summer 1967): pp. 240-241.

qualitative findings.⁴¹ Expansion of the contextual analysis, to include the entire individual press release, is intended to overcome the general lack of depth to analysis in standard examples of summative qualitative content analysis.⁴²

The presence of key terms in the dataset will not determine the accuracy of the hypothesis, but it may reveal a statistical trend within the USG messaging. Assessing the textual trends and identifying how those trends compare with similar circumstances in different nations with different security relations with the US should allow judgment over the hypothesis. Collocation of indicators for securitization and democratization is expected. When this occurs, judgement will be based on the contextual emphasis of the message.

The hypothesis suggests that the USG press releases will reflect broad support for securitization of nations closely aligned with American interests and support for democratization of nations with adversarial relations with the US. Indicators of support for democratic reform or liberalization in nations that are aligned with the US are very likely to be present, but will likely not be as overt as for nations that are adversarial to American interests. This hypothesis will be accepted as valid if this scenario is realized through the analysis of the dataset. Should the releases propose securitization for adversarial nations or overt democratization for partner states, the hypothesis will be rejected.

The Department of State is the most prominent ‘voice’ of the USG in matters related to international affairs, thus it is the most likely governmental body to provide

⁴¹ Steven Miller and Marcel Fredricks, “Can There Be ‘Rules’ For Qualitative Inquiry,” *Journal of Thought* 31, no. 2 (Summer 1996): pp. 62-66. | Todd Jick, “Mixing Qualitative and Quantitative Methods: Triangulation in Action,” *Administrative Science Quarterly* 24, no. 4 (December 1979): pp. 606-608.

⁴² Hsieh and Shannon, “Three Approaches to Qualitative Content Analysis,” pp. 1285.

relevant statements for the convergence of U.S. foreign policy and ongoing foreign affairs. A purposively sampled dataset was selected from the archived press releases of the US Department of State's Bureau of Near Asian Affairs. All press releases issued between December 1, 2010 through December 31, 2011 were collected for review, providing approximately 54 weeks of material after the start of the Arab Spring protests. Using this curated set of USG records is intended to create an uniformity to the dataset, remove any overt selection bias on the part of the researcher, and preserve any biases held by the USG.

Limitations

There are limitations of this method and dataset that must be acknowledged. Qualitative content analysis is a subjective method, therefore generalizability of conclusions will likely be minimal, particularly with the study focusing on closely related case studies. The dataset is public press releases archived on a single Department of State website, thus it does not contain every statement issued by the State Department, much less the USG, relevant to the Arab Spring events. Private and diplomatic discussions are not available in public releases nor are any classified government policy deliberations, which reduces the overall value of using public statements to judge USG responses to individual events.

Data⁴³

The full tables for the text review of the dataset have been condensed into three separate tables (see below for Tables 1-3). This condensed format provides an overview

⁴³ For a full listing of the Department of State releases spanning 01 December 2010 – 31 December 2011, see the Appendix.

of the primary subject and press release number, the total dataset, and the specific portion of the dataset of interest to this study – press releases directly relevant to the Arab Spring movement. Relevance to the Arab Spring movement was determined by examining each press release for references to protests and/or government transition in response to protests. If the press release did not contain any reference to either protests or governmental transitions, the press release was deemed irrelevant to the Arab Spring movement for the quantitative review regardless of the broader context of the press release.

Table 1: Countries of Reference and Press Release Number

	Dec 2010	Jan 2011	Feb 2011	Mar 2011	Apr 2011	May 2011	Jun 2011	Jul 2011	Aug 2011	Sep 2011	Oct 2011	Nov 2011	Dec 2011
Egypt	1	1	1; 2; 3; 4; 7					7	7; 12	15	1	3	
Jordan	3		16										
Palestine/Israel	5; 6			1		5	6; 7; 8	9	3; 4; 5; 8; 13	2; 4; 8; 20	3; 4; 14		6
Iran		2; 6	12	7		6	16	5; 6	1; 14		10		4; 10
Iraq		3	5; 10	3; 4	3	2	1; 2; 14; 17; 18; 19	8		5	7	1; 8	1; 3; 9
Tunisia		4; 5				1				18		4	
Kuwait			9										
Libya			13; 14; 15	5		7	3; 11; 12; 15		2; 15; 17	11; 13	2; 5; 8	2	
Bahrain						3							
KSA					2			2					
Yemen	4						9			19	13		
Morocco							5					6	
Syria								1; 3; 4	6; 9; 11; 16	6; 10; 12; 22		7	8
Lebanon									10				2
Algeria										16; 17			
UAE												5	5
Regional - Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco, Libya	2												
Regional - KSA, Bahrain			6										
Regional - International Waters			8										
Regional - Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain, Oman, UAE			11										
Regional - Kuwait, Iraq				2; 6									
Regional - Qatar, Sudan					1								
Regional - FTO						4							
Regional - Egypt, Tunisia						8				7			
Regional - Kuwait, Tunisia, Morocco							4						
Regional - Oman, Yemen							13						
Regional - OIC							10						
Regional - Egypt, Israel										9; 14			
Regional - Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco, Mauritania										21			
Regional - Syria, Iran											6		
Regional - Iraq, Turkey											9		
Regional - Jordan, KSA, UAE											11		
Regional - KSA, UAE													11
Regional - Lebanon, Syria											12		
Regional - MENA													7
N/A - Eid										1; 3			
N/A - IEA Director, Libya												9	

Table 2: Tally Data Overview.

Month	Total Press Releases	Tally of Coded Terms: Total	Arab Spring-Related Releases	Tally of Coded Terms: Arab Spring-Related Releases	Press Release No.
Dec-10	6	54	0	0	N/A
Jan-11	6	39	2	22	4, 5
Feb-11	16	198	11	109	1-4, 6-7, 11, 13-16
Mar-11	7	92	1	37	5
Apr-11	3	24	0	0	N/A
May-11	8	75	4	52	1, 3, 7-8
Jun-11	19	158	7	72	2, 3, 9, 11-13, 15
Jul-11	9	82	2	31	1, 4
Aug-11	17	84	5	42	11-12, 15-17
Sep-11	22	221	10	166	6-7, 9-13, 15, 18, 22
Oct-11	14	49	7	35	1-2, 5-6, 8, 11-12
Nov-11	9	46	2	29	3, 7
Dec-11	11	21	0	0	N/A
Totals	147	1143	51	595	

Table 3: Key Terms and Tallies

Coded Term	Hits Total (Arab Spring- Related)	Coded Term	Hits Total (Arab Spring- Related)	Coded Term	Hits Total (Arab Spring- Related)
Abuse	14 (1)	Harass	1 (1)	Resistance	3 (2)
Activist	8 (6)	Humanitarian	15 (11)	Restraint	5 (3)
Advocate	5 (4)	Inclusive	4 (4)	Revolution	3 (2)
Anti-American	2 (0)	Infringement	1 (0)	Rights	48 (23)
Arab Spring	2 (2)	Interlocute	4 (2)	Rule	10 (5)
Aspiration	8 (6)	Intimidate	3 (3)	Safe	10 (7)
Assembly	4 (4)	Justice/Judicial	23 (6)	Sanctions	24 (4)
Assure	4 (2)	Law	34 (11)	Security	61 (23)
Attack	36 (14)	Leaders	42 (15)	Solidarity	2 (1)
Brutal	6 (6)	Legitimate	6 (2)	Stability	13 (5)
Civil Society	19 (15)	Movement	2 (0)	Stand	8 (7)
Collaborate	9 (5)	Negotiate	26 (4)	Strategy	17 (3)
Condemn	11 (3)	Opportunity	47 (21)	Support	87 (51)
Corrupt	14 (6)	Opposition	10 (8)	Suspend	4 (4)
Crackdown	4 (2)	Partner	70 (24)	Terror	38 (14)
Criminal	13 (4)	Peace	36 (17)	Torture	2 (1)
Democracy	25 (23)	Persecution	2 (1)	Transition	40 (33)
Demonstrate	14 (12)	Promote	16 (5)	Tyranny/Tyrant	1 (1)
Detain/Arrest/Jail	16 (11)	Protest	11 (5)	Unrest	2 (2)
Dialogue	20 (11)	Rebel	2 (1)	Uprising	3 (3)
Elections	9 (9)	Reconciliate	2 (2)	Victim	7 (0)
Evacuate	15 (15)	Reform	18 (12)	Violate	6 (4)
Expression	9 (9)	Regime	31 (24)	Violence	25 (17)
Freedom	13 (11)	Rejection	1 (1)	Welfare	2 (2)
Grievance	2 (2)	Repress/Oppress	8 (6)	Youth	25 (11)

Analysis

Quantitative Assessment

Over the course of the measured period, a total of 147 Press Releases were assessed; of these, only 51 of the press releases were of direct relevance to the Arab Spring events. Within the press releases identified as related to the Arab Spring, the State Department focused on Tunisia (four releases), Egypt (nine releases), Bahrain (two releases), Libya (15 releases), Syria (11 releases), Jordan (one release), Yemen (one

release), and assorted regional messages which were not specific to a single nation and/or addressed multiple nations (eight releases).⁴⁴ Individual key terms with the highest tallies within Arab Spring-related Press Releases include Support (51 tallies), Transition (33 tallies), Partner (24 tallies), Regime (24 tallies), Democracy (23 tallies), Security (23 tallies), and Rights (23 tallies).

Tunisia and Egypt (partner states), and Libya and Syria (adversarial states) will be addressed in the quantitative comparative analysis and in the qualitative latent content analysis due to their larger data pools, creating four case studies. Key terms that strongly correlated with strategic partner states include: partner, strategy, transition, collaborate, stabilize, negotiate, and dialogue. These terms may indicate potential support for securitization of relations, a tentative assessment that will be further assessed in the qualitative review. Similarly, key terms that strongly correlated with adversarial states and may indicate potential support of democratization include: violate, regime, tyrant, brutal, crackdown, sanction, intimidate, and persecute.

Tunisia, addressed individually in four Arab Spring-related releases, received a total of 108 tallied terms. Among these, the top-five highest tallied terms were Support (17 tallies), Partner (eight tallies), Transition (eight tallies), Opportunity (six tallies), and Democracy (six tallies). Among the key terms identified as indicators for securitization and democratization, Tunisian-related releases received 24 tallies for terms linked to securitization and two tallies for terms linked to democratization.

⁴⁴ Note: This tally of country-specific releases is only capturing the press releases assessed as relevant to the Arab Spring. Various other releases were included in the total dataset which addressed the named nations, but those releases had no direct relevance to the events of the Arab Spring.

Egypt, addressed individually in nine releases, received a total of 89 tallied codes. Among these, the top five highest tallied terms were Violence (10 tallies), Demonstrate (nine tallies), Peace (nine tallies), Evacuate (nine tallies), and Transition (six tallies). Among the key terms identified as indicators for securitization and democratization, Egyptian-related releases received 18 total tallies for terms linked to securitization and one total tally for terms linked to democratization.

Libya, addressed individually in 15 Arab Spring-related releases, received a total of 122 tallied codes. Among these, the top five highest tallied terms were Support (14 tallies), Humanitarian (11 tallies), Regime (10 tallies), Transition (10 tallies), and Security (nine tallies). Among the key terms identified as indicators for securitization and democratization, Libyan-related releases received 15 total tallies for terms linked to securitization and 15 total tallies for terms linked to democratization.

Syria, addressed individually in 11 Arab Spring-related releases, received a total of 112 tallied codes. Among these, the top five highest tallied terms were Regime (12 tallies), Attack (10 tallies), Rights (eight tallies), Activist (six tallies), and Peace (six tallies). Among the key terms identified as indicators for securitization and democratization, Syrian-related releases received five total tallies for terms linked to securitization and 27 total tallies for terms linked to democratization.

Table 4: Tentative Quantitative Assessment

Country	Securitization Tally	Democratization Tally	Tentative Assessment
Egypt	15	1	Securitization
Libya	15	15	Undetermined
Syria	5	27	Democratization
Tunisia	24	2	Securitization

With this frequency count, the hypothesis is tentatively validated by three of the four case studies. In the cases of Egypt and Tunisia, the tallies for the securitization key terms outnumber the tallies of democratization key terms while in the cases of Syria, the inverse is true; this is in line with the strategic positioning of the US. The Libya case study, resolving to a tie, requires contextual analysis for a determination.

Qualitative Assessment

Under latent content analysis, all press releases related to Egypt, Tunisia, Syria, and Libya will be reviewed in order to generate sufficient contextual reference to how language use changes within the dataset. Pertinent themes will be developed between and within case studies.

Egypt

16 total press releases relate to Egypt, although not all are relevant to the Arab Spring. The USG refers to reform throughout these press releases; however, none of the proposed reforms directly challenged the legitimacy of the government.

Social reform and economic reform are featured topics in the two Egypt-related press releases that precede the Arab Spring protests. The press release indirectly advocates for social reform through the work of an Egyptian woman who was an alumna of the International Visitor Leadership Program of the US Department of State.⁴⁵ Through the woman, the USG is promoting the development of foreign and transnational civil society, one of the identified mechanisms by which an external party can promote democratization and one of the goals identified within the 2010 NSS.⁴⁶ The woman's

⁴⁵ Appendix, Press Release 1, December 2010.

⁴⁶ National Security Strategy. May 2010. Page 12.

work itself may enable critiques of the Egyptian social status quo yet her challenges on social issues only indirectly challenge the government to institute any liberalization policy. Notably, the USG does not call for the Egyptian state to create social reform of any kind within the press release. The lack of an overt call to action may indicate a USG desire for change to develop organically in the state.

The other pre-Arab Spring press release addresses economic reform through the Global Entrepreneurship Program, within which it is established that economic reform has already taken place.⁴⁷ More importantly, the press release acknowledges the active role of the Egyptian government in reforming the economy.⁴⁸ As assessed by Durac and Cavatorta (2009), non-democratic states can co-opt economic reforms, limiting the efficacy of economic liberalization as a pathway to democratization. Per the 2010 NSS, use of international investment serves to further integrate Egypt into the global economy and build a stronger Egyptian government, while simultaneously gaining greater US access to the Egyptian market.⁴⁹ In the press release, there are no indicators of overt calls for reform or democratization. Use of words such as “partner” to describe the Egyptian government, as well as terms such as “opportunity” and “invest” indicate that the US supported a securitized framework with liberalization policies prior to the outbreak of the Arab Spring protests in Egypt.

The first two post-protest press releases for Egypt, released on 1-2 February 2011, reveal a focus on US interests, specifically the US citizens located within Egypt and the evacuation efforts during ongoing demonstrations to ensure the safety of those citizens.⁵⁰

⁴⁷ Appendix, Press Release 1, January 2011. Paragraphs 2-3, 5.

⁴⁸ Appendix, Press Release 1, January 2011. Paragraph 3-4.

⁴⁹ National Security Strategy. May 2010. Page 24, 26-27, 31-34.

⁵⁰ Appendix, Press Release 1, February 2011. | Appendix, Press Release 2, February 2011.

This early press release makes no effort to characterize the nature of the demonstrations and acknowledges a safety concern that demonstrators could target US citizens which indicates the USG may have been uncertain of the purpose of the demonstrations or the nature of the protestors. By acknowledging that concern regarding the demonstrations, the press release frames protestors as a potential threat while remaining silent on the role of the government in creating the circumstances that lead to the demonstrations or any role that the government may have in escalating the tensions with the protestors. A theme that emerges from the depiction of threat that differentiates securitization and democratization is that threats to US interests are presumed to emanate from the demonstrations or clashes with demonstrations in partner states while the threats to US interests are openly acknowledged to emanate from the governments/proponents in adversarial states.

Also released on 2 February 2011, the third post-protest press release addresses an episode of violence during otherwise peaceful protests.⁵¹ This missive acknowledges the restraint demonstrated by the Egyptian Armed Forces during the protests, calls for accountability for violent actors, encourages dialogue between the government and the opposition, and expresses support for a democratic government in line with the “aspirations of the Egyptian people.”⁵² Importantly, the press release does not place responsibility for the violence on the Egyptian security apparatus, although it was believed that some of the violence was precipitated by plainclothes government security forces operating within the pro-government demonstrators during confrontations with

⁵¹ Appendix, Press Release 3, February 2011.

⁵² Appendix, Press Release 3, February 2011. Paragraphs 1-2.

anti-government demonstrators.⁵³ In essence, this press release respects the role of the security apparatus as an institution, calling for accountability only against the parties “responsible for violent acts” as opposed to denouncing the entire security apparatus for any overreach during the public protests.⁵⁴ Such a stance would indicate support for securitization of relations; however, the missive also called for a transition to a “more open, pluralistic, and democratic government,” which would indicate support for democratization.⁵⁵ The final sentence of the missive is key to determining the stance of the USG, “Lastly, the Secretary noted that the United States remains committed to working in partnership with Egypt in helping to achieve the aspiration of the Egyptian people.”⁵⁶ As a stand-alone statement, this would indicate a willingness to support the Egyptian government (“...partnership with Egypt in...”) as opposed to directly supporting the Egyptian people; it allows the US Government to publicly maintain its pledged support for democratization while concurrently protecting its relationship with an important regional security partner in the incumbent Egyptian government. Bolstering this assessment is the fact that the press release details a phone call between Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Egyptian Vice President Omar Soliman.⁵⁷ Secretary Clinton did not issue an open letter remark directed at the Egyptian government with her concerns nor did she communicate with the Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs regarding the official concerns between the two states; while highly circumspect, this form of contact

⁵³ “Egypt Uprising of 2011,” *Encyclopaedia Britannica*.

⁵⁴ Appendix, Press Release 3, February 2011. Paragraph 1.

⁵⁵ Appendix, Press Release 3, February 2011, Paragraph 2.

⁵⁶ Appendix, Press Release 3, February 2011. Paragraph 2.

⁵⁷ Appendix, Press Release 3, February 2011. Paragraph 2.

could be indicative of the close relations between the two states as the USG sidestepped the professional diplomats in favor of direct contact.

Another press released on 2 February 2011, addressing the same violence as Secretary Clinton did during her phone call, condemned violence against peaceful protestors and journalists, stating that the violence represents a threat to the goals of the protestors and calling for restraint.⁵⁸ This press release is not directly stating support for securitization or democratization, nor does it attempt to assign responsibility for the violence. Notably, the missive also makes no reference to democracy nor does it attempt to identify the goals of the Egyptian people, rendering this a statement of support for the right to peacefully protest. Support for the right to peaceably protest can be assessed as support for liberalization, and such support is in line with the language of the 2010 NSS regarding support to peaceful democratic movements.

A statement released on 22 February 2011 indicates support for the Egyptian protest movement by describing a process of direct engagement with a news organization popular with the demographic population that supported the protest movement and the US Secretary of State.⁵⁹ Demonstrators from Tahrir Square developed some of the questions for the Secretary.⁶⁰ There is no overt language within the missive that supports democratization or securitization, but there is language that accentuated the desire of the USG to engage with civil society and Egyptian youths as well as statements supporting rights of expression and association.⁶¹ By placing an emphasis on engaging civil society, supporting fundamental freedoms, and targeting the protesting demographic, support for

⁵⁸ Appendix, Press Release 4, February 2011. Paragraphs 1-2.

⁵⁹ Appendix, Press Release 7, February 2011. Paragraphs 1-2, 5-6.

⁶⁰ Appendix, Press Release 7, February 2011. Paragraph 4.

⁶¹ Appendix, Press Release 7, February 2011. Paragraph 6.

liberalization is latent. The context of this press release bolsters the theoretical underpinnings of the boomerang effect of Keck and Sikkink; however, the engagement between the social movement participants and the USG lacks the traditionally defined social movement *organization* and there is only indication of USG ideational support for the social movement as opposed to more tangible forms of support that could be used to effect change within Egypt. This would reinforce the Mansfield and Snyder assessment regarding external powers' lack of influence over democratization.

Similarly, a press release released on 25 May 2011 supports the liberalization of Egypt and Tunisia.”⁶² Repeated usage of terms such as “democratic transition,” “opportunity,” “reform,” “partner,” “investment,” “stability,” and “global markets” and references to various multilateral and international organizations (G8, IMF, World Bank, African Development Bank, and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development) indicates that the USG seeks liberalization in Egypt and Tunisia and hopes to draw Egypt and Tunisia deeper into the global economy and the liberal international order. Nevertheless, this release is not directed toward Egypt but towards other members of the G8, and is aspirational in nature, detailing how democratic transitions in Egypt and Tunisia could be aided by external partners through financial policy.⁶³ Overt dialogue of this nature is not directed towards Egypt or Tunisia, reducing the value of the USG messaging regarding the promotion of democratization.

One of the press releases addresses the status of the Bright Star combined military exercise coined . The US Department of State response indicated the mutual decision to

⁶² Appendix, Press Release 8, May 2011. Paragraph 4.

⁶³ Appendix, Press Release 8, May 2011. Paragraph 1.

postpone the 2011 exercise was a “part of our routine bilateral conversations.”⁶⁴ This decision was due to “transition events” that were occurring in Egypt, although the Department of State spokesperson stated that the parties agreed to plan the 2013 iteration of the exercise in June 2012.⁶⁵ Word choice in this response (“postponed” vs “cancelled”) sends an indirect message to Egypt that it is not being abandoned and that security-related affairs will return to normal in the future. Acknowledging the transitional nature of the Egyptian state yet reaffirming the role of the security-relations reinforces USG support for securitization, particularly as the decision to postpone the exercise was stated to be mutually determined and the USG did not publicly establish any conditionality on the exercise’s future status.

Signaling more support for securitization, Secretary Clinton referred to the Egyptian-Israeli peace as a “cornerstone to regional stability.”⁶⁶ The Secretary provided her condolences to the “loved ones of an Egyptian soldier” who had recently died of injuries, likely incurred during a terrorist attack that led to Israeli military forces firing upon Egyptian soldiers.⁶⁷ The significance of this release is that it establishes an extranational role for the Egyptian government in maintaining regional stability and reveals that the USG sought to form a link to the Egyptian military by expressing condolences for a soldier’s death. While the act of expressing condolences for the death of an individual is usually insignificant in international relations, it can be interpreted as a display of support for the Egyptian military and its mission by a senior USG official in

⁶⁴ Appendix, Press Release 12, August 2011. Paragraph 1-2.

⁶⁵ Appendix, Press Release 12, August 2011. Paragraph 2.

⁶⁶ Appendix, Press Release 9, September 2011. Paragraph 1.

⁶⁷ Appendix, Press Release 9, September 2011. Paragraph 1.

this case, particularly due to the overlap in strategic security interests involving Israel and regional peace.

In another release, the spokesperson for the Department of State said, “Egypt’s transitional government, led by the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), has committed itself to carrying out a transition to the free and fair election of a civilian-led government.”⁶⁸ While this is a simple statement of fact, it offers no assessment of the military government’s efforts to liberalize society. The spokesperson also indicated that the USG has “encouraged” SCAF to implement civilian legal processes rather than using military courts and to repeal an emergency law.⁶⁹ There is overt support for democratic principles such as rule of law, human rights, and free and fair elections, but there is also a deference to SCAF as it relates to implementing these changes under the transitional government. The USG is “encouraging” SCAF to undertake these efforts, but the messaging does not indicate conditionality of support or any attempt to intervene within the domestic politics of Egypt beyond said encouragement. Such a stance would appear to support liberalization and securitization rather than full democratization.

The final press release related to Egypt during the period of measurement confirms a strong security relationship between the US and Egypt, announcing an impending gathering at the US Department of State for the Criminal Justice and Rule of Law Working Group, held under the auspices of the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF) and cohosted by Egypt.⁷⁰ As the release states, GCTF was established on 22 September 2011, which places this development well after the violence that was

⁶⁸ Appendix, Press Release 15, September 2011. Paragraph 2.

⁶⁹ Appendix, Press Release 15, September 2011. Paragraph 2.

⁷⁰ Appendix, Press Release 3, November 2011. Paragraph 1.

perpetrated by Egyptian security forces during the protests, thereby affirms the commitment between the USG and the Egyptian government.⁷¹ The missive further claims that the intent is “to provide support for countries seeking to turn their backs on repressive approaches to counterterrorism and to encourage criminal justice authorities to adopt robust and human rights-compliant counterterrorism policies and practices that protect both the security and liberty of their citizens,” specifically identifying nations involved in the Arab Spring protests as target nation-states for this support.⁷² No mention is made of Egypt’s own counterterrorism policies and practices, nor is there any mention within this release of the Arab Spring protests within Egypt or the violent repression techniques used to control protests. It cannot be determined with a significant degree of confidence why these key pieces of context were omitted in this media note; however, elevating Egypt to the role of co-host for the conference can be interpreted as a validation of the Egyptian government’s security apparatus, regardless of any differences in opinion or policy that there may be between the two states. Moreover, placing Egyptian authorities in such a prominent position in an US-based event creates a new international frame of reference for Egyptian security officials as experts in counterterrorism-related rule of law, legitimizing their actions in the international realm despite any abuses within the domestic realm. The note’s reference to security practices that “protect both the security and liberty of their citizens” can be interpreted as support for democratization; however, it would likely be more accurately interpreted as support for liberalization and the institution of rule of law. Establishing a consolidated democracy would require

⁷¹ Appendix, Press Release 3, November 2011. Paragraph 1.

⁷² Appendix, Press Release 3, November 2011. Paragraphs 2-3.

liberalization, but illiberal democracies and non-democratic governments also embrace forms of liberalization as identified in the fallacy of the transition paradigm.

Overall, the language of the press releases related to Egypt indicates a strong preference for securitization over democratization. USG messaging supports liberalization, but it is undermined by both the language used in those statements (encouraging reform while offering deference to the military) and outweighed by the larger volume of material addressing the security forces in a neutral or positive manner. The case of Egypt validates the working hypothesis. While Egypt is non-democratic and has employed repressive techniques to subdue peaceful protests, it is a strategic security partner of the US in a geo-strategically significant region of the world.

Tunisia

Of the 147 Press Releases, 9 relate to Tunisia, although not all 9 are directly relevant to the events of the Arab Spring. Press releases will be addressed chronologically and based on relevance.

The first press release regarding Arab Spring events in Tunisia was issued 23 January 2011. Principally addressing the democratic transition that the interim government was shepherding, the press release expresses support for the efforts to create a more inclusive society, holding free and fair elections, instituting rule of law, and engaging in political reform.⁷³ This particular press release provides no context of the actual Arab Spring protests because a transitional government was already formed and efforts to democratize were already initiated organically.

⁷³ Appendix, Release 4, January 2011. Paragraph 1-2.

A joint statement by Secretary Clinton and the Tunisian Foreign Minister on 22 September 2011 announced the US-Tunisia Joint Political and Economic Partnership, a bilateral agreement addressing shared interests.⁷⁴ In addition to support for the democratization and state building processes, economic cooperation and liberalization, and educational cooperation, the USG and Tunisian government agreed to cooperate on security matters.⁷⁵ To be specific, the agreement addressed security matters related to “training assistance, information-sharing, and work to counter extremist messaging,” as well as bolster Tunisia’s “defense capabilities.”⁷⁶ Through this agreement, it is obvious that the USG is rendering financial aid in support of democratization efforts; however, the inclusion of defense aid confirms the willingness to securitize relations.

Tunisia lacks the long-lasting strategic relationship with the USG that Egypt developed over years of security cooperation. In spite of this, Tunisia is a nation that meets the standard for securitization of relations because of its self-directed democratization process and integration into the broader liberal international system through economic and educational cooperation with the US as well as its support to the Global War on Terror. Tunisia does not represent a threat to the international order that would require isolation or direct intervention, thus it validates the working hypothesis as an example of securitization.

Libya

Of the 147 press releases, 20 relate to Libya, although not all 20 are directly relevant to the Arab Spring. In them, there is a notable distinction between the language

⁷⁴ Appendix, Release 18, September 2011. Page 1, Paragraph 1, 3.

⁷⁵ Appendix, Release 18, September 2011. Pages 2-3.

⁷⁶ Appendix, Release 18, September 2011. Page 2.

of the releases concerning Muammar Gadhafi or his government and those concerning the Transitional National Council (TNC). This distinction between the TNC and the Gadhafi-led government justifies the earlier quantitative findings.

The releases addressing Gadhafi and his government place more attention on the humanitarian crisis created by the effort to retain power. Extrajudicial action targeting noncombatants is observable from the first Libya-centric press release, which linked unauthorized journalists to terrorist organizations without any evidence or due process.⁷⁷ As a result, the press release contains a warning of danger to media personnel posed by the Libyan government and its supporters. This is the inverse of the presentation of threats that was observed in the press release involving the early Egyptian demonstrations, creating a cleavage in how partner and adversarial states are addressed.

Press releases concerning the government of Libya changed the word choice from “government” to “regime” or “Gaddafi regime” after state-sanctioned violence against peaceful protestors was initiated.⁷⁸ The word ‘regime,’ as a reference to government, carries an innately negative connotation in modern American English and associating a regime with a single person can be intended to underline the authoritarian nature or the personification of the referenced government. The words ‘violence’ and ‘regime’ are frequently collocated within the press releases linked to Libya, Syria, and even Iran (which falls outside of the scope of this study).

For the press releases related to the Gadhafi government, there is a clear preference for the removal of Gadhafi and a direct call for the democratization of Libya.⁷⁹

⁷⁷ Appendix, Release 13, February 2011.

⁷⁸ Appendix, Release 5, March 2011.

⁷⁹ Appendix, Release 3, June 2011. Page 2.

There are no calls for specific pieces of reform (e.g. free and fair elections, rule of law, freedom of expression...) that could be used to placate external powers. Under the condition of civil war, Gadhafi-era Libya meets the requirements for democratization under this study; unfortunately, this assessment cannot be generalized to adversarial states due to the impact of state-sanctioned violence on Libya during the period of measurement.

Libya is unique within this dataset due to the number of releases related to the Transitional National Council (TNC), an opposition body that formed in Libya during the civil conflict. USG and international support is clearly stated in multiple releases.⁸⁰ Within the context of this study, the TNC emerged to assume a similar position as the transitional governments of Egypt and Tunisia, even though Libya was facing very different circumstances by virtue of the military conflict. References to legitimacy, rights, and transition (of power) all indicate support for the greater integration of the TNC into the international order.⁸¹ Ties to the international order similarly situated both Tunisia and Egypt as states who fell under the securitization umbrella, but the TNC lacks the official government status due to the open conflict initiated by the Gadhafi-led government. Regardless of official status, it is reasonable to conclude that the TNC is embraced as a securitized state in its role as a shadow government.

Syria

Of the 147 press releases, 15 relate to Syria, although not all 15 are directly relevant to the Arab Spring. Press releases will be addressed chronologically and based on relevance.

⁸⁰ Appendix, Release 7, May 2011. | Release 3, June 2011.

⁸¹ Appendix, Release 7, May 2011. | Release 11, June 2011.

The first press release relevant to Syria was issued on 5 July 2011. Within that release, the language used clearly establishes that the Syrian government has engaged in unacceptable actions against peaceful protestors: specific examples of this are include “ongoing attacks against peaceful protestors,” “repression and harassment on peaceful protestors and opposition members,” “killing protestors,” and “intimidation and arrest campaign.”⁸² The release similarly establishes that there is limited trust in the statements of the government of Syria, especially since its actions and the actions of its security forces directly contradict its stated interest of engaging in “dialogue with the opposition.”⁸³ Concluding the release is a call for the Syrian government to cease its current actions and allow a “genuine transition to democracy” occur, while the USG further states that the international community is in solidarity with the Syrian people.⁸⁴ Violations of international mores on the use of legitimate state violence leads to the ostracization of the Syrian government from the broader international community. Due to the excessive actions of the Syrian security forces, this release features a direct call for democratization that requires no analysis to determine.

A press release from 8 July 2011 invoked Syria’s status as a State Sponsor of Terrorism.⁸⁵ While the content of the press release is irrelevant to this study, the reference to Syria as a State Sponsor of Terrorism reaffirms that the government of Syria operates in a manner that is ill-suited for the liberal international order. Another release from 8 July 2011 brought forward the issue of Syrian embassy personnel engaging in

⁸² Appendix, Release 1, July 2011. Paragraph 1.

⁸³ Appendix, Release 1, July 2011. Paragraph 1.

⁸⁴ Appendix, Release 1, July 2011. Paragraph 1.

⁸⁵ Appendix, Release 3, July 2011. Paragraph 1.

surveillance of peaceful protestors in the US.⁸⁶ The press release directly emphasized the importance of individual freedoms and indirectly raised the issue of the violation of US national sovereignty. As a result of the Syrian government's actions within the US against lawful protest activities, it is assessed that this release indirectly supports democratization of Syria.

A press release from 17 August 2011 provides an example of a change in word choice similar to Libya; previously, press releases referred to the Syrian government or the government of Syria, but in this release the government of Syria is referenced as the "Assad regime."⁸⁷ Adjectives are also utilized in this release, transforming "aggression" to "brutal aggression."⁸⁸ While the change is relatively insignificant to its literal meaning, it is an overt display of increasing hostility towards the government of Syria and is intended to draw attention to how it continues to violate the rights of the Syrian people and the sensibilities of democratic states. It is assessed that this release supports democratization.

A 25 August 2011 statement iterates some of the same linguistic messaging techniques as the 17 August release through multiple references to the "regime" and repeated usage of adjectives such as "brutal."⁸⁹ Focus within this statement is on the poor treatment of human rights advocates and activists, and this statement features a "demand" for the cessation of a "campaign of terror" that includes "torture, illegal imprisonment, and murder."⁹⁰ The use of the word "demand" is more forceful than the language used in

⁸⁶ Appendix, Release 4, July 2011. Paragraph 1.

⁸⁷ Appendix, Release 11, August 2011. Paragraph 2.

⁸⁸ Appendix, Release 11, August 2011. Paragraph 2.

⁸⁹ Appendix, Release 16, August 2011.

⁹⁰ Appendix, Release 16, August 2011.

other statements which featured words such as “encourage” or “urge.” “Demand” places a greater sense of urgency on the need for change or reform. Moreover, reference to terror, torture, and murder continues a theme of tying the Syrian government to illegal and immoral actions that are not accepted in democratic societies. Rhetorical techniques are continued in a 8 September press release where Syrian government messaging was described as “regime propaganda.”⁹¹

Additional press releases are available on Syria, but their review reinforces the identified evidence. Press releases on the Syrian government reflect an increasingly hostile attitude towards the known abuses of the Syrian population and its disregard for international law and rule of law. In accordance with the parameters of this study, the USG strongly supports democratization of Syria, but as with Gadhafi-era Libya, this assessment cannot be generalized due to the outsized impact of state-sanctioned violence observed during the period of measurement.

Conclusion

These findings show that the US Government’s promotion of democracy is inconsistent as it relates to the four states reviewed in this dataset. Non-democratic state actors (e.g. Egypt, Tunisia, and Libya’s TNC) that initiate “transitional” governments are able to effectively posture as democratizing states with limited pushback from the USG press releases regarding ongoing practices. Libya and Syria failed to engage in any productive dialogue with protestors and enacted repressive tactics to maintain

⁹¹ Appendix, Release 6, September 2011. Paragraph 2.

government control, leading to overt USG calls for democratization. This establishes congruence between the qualitative and quantitative reviews.

Table 5: Final Assessment

Country	Assessment
Egypt	Securitization
Libya (Gadhafi)	Democratization
Libya (TNC)	Securitization
Syria	Democratization
Tunisia	Securitization

Overall liberalization of non-democratic states is a goal, but security concerns are prioritized higher than ideal-based goals. It cannot be determined to what length the US will go to ensure that reforms are instituted based on this study. Adversarial states are not given the same latitude as partner states, although it is also uncertain how much state-sanctioned violence influenced USG messaging. In Libya, military force was employed to confront a Libyan government-directed military campaign against its own citizens, yet in Syria no such external force was used in spite of similarities with Libya. In Egypt, platitudes were issued regarding structural reforms, but key security ties were maintained and reinforced in spite of the selective use of state-sanctioned violence against peaceful protestors.

US grand strategy appears to maintain deep engagement while offering a liberal internationalist perspective operating through a cosmopolitan approach with regards to prioritization of democracy promotion under this research study. The preferred democratization model for the USG is the transition paradigm/evolutionary model for partner states according to this study. Rhetorically, the USG supported immediate democratization of adversarial states, but the data failed to identify how the USG sought

to create these changes – external imposition of democracy was not addressed and would be unsupported by the 2010 NSS. Even in Libya, where the US supported military intervention, there was no external imposition of democracy; the Libyan TNC may provide the best example of how the USG would respond to an adversarial state democratizing. Through the TNC, the USG supported the transitional paradigm; however, the Gadhafi-led government was not a participant to that process, so it is unclear if the transitional paradigm would apply to adversarial states or only to new political entities emerging in adversarial states.

While this study finds that U.S. foreign policy remains multifaceted with competing priorities, it does not represent a departure from the orthodox conclusions within the existing body of literature on the subject. US strategy retains a preference for security and stability in the face of otherwise destabilizing democratic forces in an effort to protect a status quo for traditional allies and/or partner states. When considering adversarial nations, the U.S. strategy does not require maintenance of the national-level status quo so much as a preservation of the existing liberal international system, thus the U.S. advocates for democratic reforms in the hopes of improving the international status quo.

Insomuch as the US may prefer to maintain the status quo of international relations, an intervening variable which very likely had a significant impact on this study is state-sanctioned violence. While violence occurred at some level in each of the major states to undergo substantial Arab Spring protests, only Libya and Syria devolved into civil war during the period of measurement and only those states were determined to be subject to democratization in accordance to this study. More research will be necessary

to determine the extent to which the application of state-sanctioned violence against civilians functions as a catalyst to calls for democratization within non-democratic states, especially if democratic states are permissive of limited violence in other situations (e.g. Egypt).

A more in-depth analysis of official government records is required to gain a full understanding of the USG's position on democratization at a general level, and the Arab Spring at a more granular level. It may be valuable to conduct a comparative review between statements from the bureaucratic entities (e.g. the State Department) and the statements from senior-level elected officials and political appointees to determine if there are discrepancies in how democratization is framed, especially with non-democratic partner states. Any discrepancies between the bureaucracy and the senior officials may indicate a need to recalibrate the messaging.

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Appendix: Press Releases, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs

2010, December

Release 1: Office of the Spokesman, U.S. Department of State. "U.S. Department of State Honors Hala Galal El Sayed Mohamed of Egypt as State Alumni Member of the Month." PRN: 2010/1736. 01 December 2010. <https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2010/12/152232.htm>

Release 2: Office of the Spokesman, U.S. Department of State. "Assistant Secretary Jose W. Fernandez Holds Press Briefing on His Travel to North Africa." PRN: 2010/1764. 07 December 2010. <https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2010/12/152467.htm>

Release 3: Office of the Spokesman, U.S. Department of State. "Ten Vehicles Donated to the Jordan Standards and Metrology Organization." PRN: 2010/1803. 13 December 2010. <https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2010/12/152743.htm>

Release 4: U.S. Department of State. "American Embassy Vehicle Attacked Outside of Sana'a, Yemen." Taken Question. PRN: 2010/1833. 16 December 2010. <https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2010/12/153044.htm>

Release 5: Office of the Spokesman, U.S. Department of State. "Palestinian Information Communications Technology Capacity Building Initiative." PRN: 2010/1837. 17 December 2010. <https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2010/12/153103.htm>

Release 6: Office of the Spokesman, U.S. Department of State. "Human Rights Watch Report on Israel and the Palestinians." PRN: 2010/1857. 22 December 2010. <https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2010/12/153654.htm>

2011, January

Release 1: Office of the Spokesman, U.S. Department of State. "U.S. and Egyptian Governments Bring Entrepreneurship Delegation to Cairo." PRN: 2011/031. 09 January 2011. <https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/01/154164.htm>

Release 2: Office of the Spokesman, U.S. Department of State. "Former Iranian Chancery Property (Taken Question)." Taken Question. PRN: 2011/043. 11 January 2011. <https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/01/154307.htm>

Release 3: U.S. Department of State. "Secretary Clinton Calls Iraqi Foreign Minister." PRN: 2011/071. 18 January 2011. <https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/01/154872.htm>

Release 4: Office of the Spokesman, U.S. Department of State. "Secretary Clinton's Call to Tunisian Prime Minister Mohammed Ghannouchi." PRN: 2011/094. 23 January 2011. <https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/01/155128.htm>

Release 5: Office of the Spokesman, U.S. Department of State. "Assistant Secretary Feltman's Visit to Tunisia." PRN: 2011/96. 24 January 2011. <https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/01/155243.htm>

Release 6: Office of the Spokesman, U.S. Department of State. "The Iran Hostages – 30 Years Later." PRN: 2011/106. 26 January 2011. <https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/01/155319.htm>

2011, February

Release 1: U.S. Department of State. "Status of U.S. Citizen Evacuations from Egypt." PRN: 2010/183. 01 February 2011. <https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/02/155819.htm>

Release 2: Office of the Spokesman, U.S. Department of State. "Status of U.S. Citizen Evacuations from Egypt." PRN: 2011/149. 02 February 2011. <https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/02/155894.htm>

Release 3: Office of the Spokesman, U.S. Department of State. "Secretary Clinton's Call to Egyptian Vice President Omar Soliman." PRN: 2011/151. 02 February 2011. <https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/02/155898.htm>

Release 4: Crowley, Philip J. "Egypt: Attacks on Demonstrators and Journalists." PRN: 2011/145. 02 February 2011. <https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/02/155872.htm>

Release 5: Office of the Spokesman, U.S. Department of State. "Department of State Recruits U.S. Officers for Iraq Police Development Program." PRN: 2011/154. 03 February 2011. <https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/02/155929.htm>

Release 6: Office of the Spokesman, U.S. Department of State. "Secretary Clinton's Call With Foreign Minister of Saudi Arabia." PRN: 2011/246. 20 February 2011. <https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/02/156831.htm>

Release 7: Office of the Spokesman, U.S. Department of State. "Secretary Clinton to Participate in an Online Dialogue with Egyptian Youth Hosted by Egyptian Online Portal Masrawy.com." PRN: 2011/256. 22 February 2011. <https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/02/156909.htm>

Release 8: Clinton, Hillary. "Pirate Attack on the S/V Quest." PRN: 2011/254. 22 February 2011. <https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2011/02/156912.htm>

Release 9: Clinton, Hillary. "Kuwaiti National Day." Video Remarks. 22 February 2011. <https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2011/02/156842.htm>

Release 10: Office of the Spokesman, U.S. Department of State. "Embassy Baghdad Appoints Coordinators on Minority Issues." PRN: 2011/251. 22 February 2011. <https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/02/156907.htm>

Release 11: Office of the Spokesman, U.S. Department of State. "Assistant Secretary Feltman's Travel to Gulf Countries." PRN: 2011/260. 22 February 2011. <https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/02/156939.htm>

Release 12: Office of the Spokesman, U.S. Department of State. "Departments of the Treasury and State Announce Designations for Human Rights Abuses in Iran." PRN: 2011/265. 23 February 2011. <https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/02/156980.htm>

Release 13: Office of the Spokesman, U.S. Department of State. "Unauthorized News Media Travel in Libya." PRN: 2011/274. 24 February 2011. <https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/02/157040.htm>

Release 14: Crowley, Philip J. "Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton's Travel to Geneva." PRN: 2011/277. 24 February 2011. <https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/02/157079.htm>

Release 15: Crowley, Philip J. "Efforts to Assist U.S. Citizens in Libya." PRN: 2011/293. 26 February 2011. <https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/02/157184.htm>

Release 16: Office of the Spokesman, U.S. Department of State. "Assistant Secretary for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor Michael Posner to Visit Jordan." PRN: 2011/302. 28 February 2011. <https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/02/157457.htm>

2011, March

Release 1: Office of the Spokesman, U.S. Department of State. "Joint Statement by the Quartet." PRN: 2011/381. 12 March 2011. <https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/03/158237.htm>

Release 2: Office of the Spokesman, U.S. Department of State. "Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs Assistant Secretary Ann Stock Travel to Kuwait and Iraq March 16-22, 2011." PRN: 2011/397. 15 March 2011. <https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/03/158381.htm>

Release 3: Office of the Spokesman, U.S. Department of State. "Assistant Secretary of State William R. Brownfield Visits Iraq." PRN: 2011/393. 15 March 2011. <https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/03/158338.htm>

Release 4: Office of the Spokesman, U.S. Department of State. "Assistant Secretary of State William R. Brownfield Concludes First Trip to Iraq." PRN: 2011/409. 18 March 2011. <https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/03/158571.htm>

Release 5: Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs. "Paris Summit for the Support to the Libyan People: Communique." 19 March 2011. <https://2009-2017.state.gov/p/eur/rls/or/158663.htm>

Release 6: Office of the Spokesman, U.S. Department of State. "Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs Assistant Secretary Ann Stock Concludes First Trip to Kuwait and Iraq." PRN: 2011/463. 24 March 2011. <https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/03/159087.htm>

Release 7: Office of the Spokesman, U.S. Department of State. "Iran Sanctions Act Announcement Act." PRN: 2011/490. 29 March 2011. <https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/03/159309.htm>

2011, April

Release 1: Office of the Spokesman, U.S. Department of State. "U.S. Senior Advisor on Darfur Travels to Qatar in Support of Doha Peace Talks." PRN: 2011/525. 05 April 2011. <https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/04/160024.htm>

Release 2: Office of the Spokesman, U.S. Department of State. "United States and Saudi Arabia Initial Open Skies Agreement." PRN: 2011/597. 18 April 2011. <https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/04/161149.htm>

Release 3: Office of the Spokesman, U.S. Department of State. "Readout of Assistant Secretary Feltman's Trip to Baghdad." Taken Question. PRN: 2011/600. 18 April 2011. <https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/04/161163.htm>

2011, May

Release 1: Office of the Spokesman, U.S. Department of State. "Travel of Ambassador Melanne S. Verveer to Tunisia." PRN: 2011/676. 02 May 2011. <https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/05/162439.htm>

Release 2: U.S. Department of State. "United States Contributes \$51.5 Million in Additional Assistance for Displaced Iraqis." PRN: 2011/710. 09 May 2011. <https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/05/162869.htm>

Release 3: Office of the Spokesman, U.S. Department of State. "Deputy Secretary Steinberg's Visit to Bahrain." PRN: 2011/765. 17 May 2011. <https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/05/163554.htm>

Release 4: Office of the Spokesman, U.S. Department of State. "Designation of Army of Islam." PRN: 2011/799. 19 May 2011. <https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/05/163838.htm>

Release 5: Office of the Spokesman, U.S. Department of State. "Joint Statement by the Quartet." PRN: 2011/804. 20 May 2011. <https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/05/163941.htm>

Release 6: Office of the Spokesman, U.S. Department of State. "Changes to Visa Validity for Iranian Student Applicants in F, J, and M Visa Categories." PRN: 2011/807. 20 May 2011. <https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/05/164025.htm>

Release 7: Office of the Spokesman, U.S. Department of State. "Assistant Secretary Feltman's Travel to Benghazi." PRN: 2011/814. 23 May 2011. <https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/05/164083.htm>

Release 8: Office of the Spokesman, U.S. Department of State. "Secretary Clinton and Secretary Geithner Joint Letter to G8 Ministers." PRN: 2011/829. 25 May 2011. <https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/05/164252.htm>

2011, June

Release 1: Office of the Spokesman, U.S. Department of State. "Secretary Clinton To Deliver Remarks to Business Forum Promoting Commercial Opportunities in Iraq on June 3." PRN: 2011/878. 01 June 2011. <https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/06/164811.htm>

Release 2: Clinton, Hillary and Ray Irani. "Remarks at the Business Forum Promoting Commercial Opportunities in Iraq." PRN: 2011/898. 03 June 2011. <https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2011/06/164954.htm>

Release 3: U.S. Department of State. "Background Briefing Senior Government Officials En Route to Abu Dhabi, UAE." PRN: 2011/T48-02. 08 June 2011. <https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/06/165271.htm>

Release 4: U.S. Department of State. "Assistant Secretary Jose W. Fernandez Traveling to Kuwait, Tunisia and Morocco." PRN: 2011/949. 13 June 2011. <https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/06/166074.htm>

Release 5: U.S. Department of State. "Assistant Secretary of State Kerri-Ann Jones Travels to Morocco for GIST Conference." PRN: 2011/959. 14 June 2011. <https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/06/166133.htm>

Release 6: U.S. Department of State. "Assistant Secretary of State Esther Brimmer to Deliver Remarks at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy." PRN: 2011/960. 14 June 2011. <https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/06/166134.htm>

Release 7: Office of the Spokesman, U.S. Department of State. "U.S. Policy on Israeli Settlements (Taken Question)." Taken Question. PRN: 2011/976. 16 June 2011. <https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/06/166371.htm>

Release 8: Office of the Spokesman, U.S. Department of State. "David Hale's and Dennis Ross' Meetings in the Middle East (Taken Question)." Taken Question. PRN: 2011/975. 16 June 2011. <https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/06/166372.htm>

Release 9: U.S. Department of State. "U.S. Meetings in Yemen (Taken Question)." Taken Question. PRN: 2011/988. 17 June 2011. <https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/06/166480.htm>

Release 10: Office of the Spokesman, U.S. Department of State. "State Department and OIC Commit to Promote Women's and Girls' Engagement in Science." PRN: 2011/989. 17 June 2011. <https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/06/166481.htm>

Release 11: Office of the Spokesman, U.S. Department of State. "Transitional National Council Oil Sales (Taken Question)." Taken Question. PRN: 2011/1010. 20 June 2011. <https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/06/166573.htm>

Release 12: Office of the Spokesman, U.S. Department of State. "Status of Assistance to the Transitional National Council (Taken Question)." Taken Question. PRN: 2011/1006. 20 June 2011. <https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/06/166566.htm>

Release 13: Office of the Spokesman, U.S. Department of State. "Assistant Secretary Feltman's Travel to Oman and Yemen (Taken Question)." Taken Question. PRN: 2011/1007. 20 June 2011. <https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/06/166569.htm>

Release 14: Office of the Spokesman, U.S. Department of State. "Settlement of Claims of U.S. Victims of the Saddam Hussein Regime With the Government of Iraq." PRN: 2011/1024. 21 June 2011. <https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/06/166691.htm>

Release 15: U.S. Department of State. "Libyan Students Receive Funding to Continue Studies in the U.S." PRN: 2011/1038. 23 June 2011. <https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/06/166869.htm>

Release 16: Office of the Spokesman, U.S. Department of State. "Joint Statement on Iran Sanctions." PRN: 2011/1033. 23 June 2011. <https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/06/166814.htm>

Release 17: Office of the Spokesman, U.S. Department of State. "U.S. Department of State Announces Third Iraq Youth Sports International Exchange June 22-July 2." PRN: 2011/1071. 26 June 2011. <https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/06/167096.htm>

Release 18: Office of the Spokesman, U.S. Department of State. "Secretary Clinton Meets with Iraqi Council of Representatives Speaker." PRN: 2011/1065. 26 June 2011. <https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/06/167094.htm>

Release 19: Office of the Spokesman, U.S. Department of State. "National Emergency with Respect to the Stabilization of Iraq to Continue for Full Year." PRN: 2011/1088. 30 June 2011. <https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/06/167387.htm>

2011, July

Release 1: Nuland, Victoria. "Syria - Ongoing Situation." PRN: 2011/1114. 05 July 2011. <https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/07/167577.htm>

Release 2: Office of the Spokesman, U.S. Department of State. "U.S. Department of State Announces First International Sports Exchange With Athletes From Saudi Arabia." PRN: 2011/1136. 07 July 2011. <https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/07/167833.htm>

Release 3: Office of the Spokesman, U.S. Department of State. "Syrian Ambassador Mustapha's Travel Within the United States." Taken Question. 08 July 2011. <https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/07/167953.htm>

Release 4: Office of the Spokesman, U.S. Department of State. "Syrian Ambassador Mustapha Called Into the State Department." Taken Question. PRN: 2011/1149. 08 July 2011. <https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/07/167959.htm>

Release 5: U.S. Department of State. "New U.S. Visa Restrictions on Iranian Officials for Human Rights Abuses." PRN: 2011/1141. 08 July 2011. <https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/07/167901.htm>

Release 6: Office of the Spokesman, U.S. Department of State. "Argentina/Iran/Venezuela: Nuclear Technology." Taken Question. PRN: 2011/1184. 13 July 2011. <https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/07/168491.htm>

Release 7: Office of the Spokesman, U.S. Department of State. "U.S. Department of State Announces Former NBA Player Sam Vincent and WNBA Legend Andrea Stinson to Travel to Jordan July 17-22." PRN: 2011/1204. 18 July 2011. <https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/07/168691.htm>

Release 8: Office of the Spokesman, U.S. Department of State. "State Department Grant Invites Iraqi Police to United States for Specialized Training." PRN: 2011/1245. 27 July 2011. <https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/07/169168.htm>

Release 9: Office of the Spokesman, U.S. Department of State. "Visiting Retired Israeli Diplomats and Military Officers." Taken Question. PRN: 2011/1255. 29 July 2011. <https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/07/169243.htm>

2011, August

Release 1: Office of the Spokesman, U.S. Department of State. "'Ask Alan,' a New Way to Engage with Iranians." PRN: 2011/1267. 02 August 2011. <https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/08/169469.htm>

Release 2: Office of the Spokesman, U.S. Department of State. "Security for the Libyan Embassy." Taken Question. PRN: 2011/1278. 05 August 2011. <https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/08/169788.htm>

Release 3: Office of the Spokesman, U.S. Department of State. "Housing Construction in East Jerusalem." Taken Question. PRN: 2011/1293. 09 August 2011. <https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/08/170195.htm>

Release 4: Office of the Spokesman, U.S. Department of State. "David Hale's Contact with Palestinian Negotiator Saeb Erekat." Taken Question. PRN: 2011/1292. 09 August 2011. <https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/08/170192.htm>

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Curriculum Vita

David Gilliland has actively pursued knowledge of foreign languages and cultures in his scholarly endeavors. He received a B.A. in Arabic Studies from the University of Maryland, College Park prior to his graduate studies at Johns Hopkins University.